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I am going to describe as best I can What happened during the impact of the
C.I.D., as well as discuss the planned versus the actual impact.
The scenario that we were attempting to conduct is identified on figure i. The
scenario here represents almost a year or year and a half of negotiations among the
project participants. There was a lot of interest in how this impact would take
place. The aircraft manufacturing industry and the participating government organi-
zations all had input to the desired scenario. We were changing this right up to
the last week prior to the C.I.D. mission. The FAA knew that they wanted a survivable
accident. In order to do that it seemed clear that we needed to have the landing
gear retracted so that the fuselage would not fracture aft of the wing because of the
high sink rate. The longitudinal velocity and gross weight were relatively easy to
achieve. The difficulty came with the longitudinal impact window. That was primarily
driven by the crashworthiness people wanting to have 75 milliseconds of time after
ground impact, but prior to impact with the wing openers. The AMK people did not
want the airplane to land too long and therefore be going too slow by the time that
it impacted the wing openers. So the last change that was made to the scenario was
the addition of 50 feet on the longitudinal envelope. The concern was that we would
not be able to impact the airplane that precisely with the control and guidance
system we had. In fact, that did turn out to be the case.
The approach to accomplish the objectives was to remotely control the vehicle to
an impact site prepared on the dry lakebed at Edwards as depicted in figure 2. We
utiliized many of the systems that we had utilized in the remote control of the HiMAT,
DAST, and spin research vehicles that we had flown remotely at Dryden previously. The
control system that was developed is illustrated in figures 3 and 4. The airborne and
the ground portions of the control system are respectively depicted. We primarily
used the autopilot that was in the airplane (Bendix PB-20) to provide control of the
airplane. In addition to the control functions that the autopilot performed it was
necessary to mechanize several housekeeping functions to actuate things like flaps,
landing gear, shutting the engines down, and so forth. The system had a separate
and independent terminate system that had the capability of causing the airplane to
dive into the ground if we were to lose control of the vehicle through the single
string autopilot and airborne control system. The ground-based system had almost
a totally dualized control capability. It had dual computational capability going
into the ground-based cockpit. Several radars received the data and brought it into
the ground computers so that it could be processed and displayed to the pilot. The
system had a dual transmitting capability up to the airplane. Figure 4 also shows
the independent ground-based terminate system. Basically the control concept was
single string with the terminate safety relief in case of loss of control through the
single string system.
Having a terminate system required a sterile area in which the airplane could be
terminated and not impact any property or lives. Figure 5 depicts the sterile area.
The photographers had to be located outside this sterile area, which made their task
more difficult. The terminate profile was identified and we knew that if we
terminated the airplane anywhere along the flight path, that it would impact in a
sterile area. The airplane took off on lakebed runway 17 and flew the profile.
There was no go-around accomplished on the C.I.D. mission so the flight profile was
as shown. Figure 6 illistrates the crash site. A rockbed 1200 feet long and 300
feet wide of coarse railroad gravel was laid to provide a friction ignition source.
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An aiming fence was prepared to enable the pilot to have better guidance longi-
tudinally. Figure 7 depicts the wing openers that were installed to open the wings
after impact.
Figure 8 summarizes the manned flight development of these systems. The airplane
was flown 14 times with a crew on board. The development flights totaled about 30
hours of flight time. About 52 percent of that time was devoted to RPV control
system development. The airplane accomplished 9 takeoffs and 13 landings under
remote control and about 69 approaches to the C.I.D. site down to altitudes between
150 and 200 feet. That was the lowest altitude from which a safe go-around could
be effected since the landing gear was retracted for the actual impact. The day of
impact timeline is shown in figure 9. It looks like a 9:13 takeoff time is pretty
leisurely, but we were actually out there about 4:00 in the morning preparing for
this. The mission from brake release to impact was something on the order of 9
minutes with a very short interval of time between the initial impact of the no. 1
engine and the fuselage impact. The telemetered data stayed on for a significant
period of time after the impact and total data failure occurred at 09:22:12.8.
The weight and balance for the C.I.D. mission are shown in figure I0. The
mission used 8000 pounds of fuel during the flight profile. The fuel used was
obtained by integrating the fuel flow meters. All of that fuel came out of the
center wing tank. All the fuel boost punps were on so the center wing override
boost pump was predominant. The airplane had 76,000 pounds of AMK on for the final
mission.
Figure Ii shows the wreckage distribution. This figure was provided by the
FAA's Accident Investigation Team. It shows that the airplane impacted fairly close
to the center line. Several areas of impact definition are still confusing and I
will address that a little bit later. The airplane slid into the wing openers with
a relatively large skew angle and then debris scattered throughout an area about
1500 feet long. The airplane came to rest with the right wing over the left side
of the fuselage.
The data that has been obtained on impact is compared with the goals set out
prior to the impact on figure 12. The actual sink rate was very close to the desired
sink rate. The airspeed was right on. The fuselage hit 281 feet lone of the impact
envelope and the wing hit 410 feet long. The data showed the lateral deviation was
34 feet to the right of the centerline. The roll attitude was the variable that was
probably the furthest off; it was -12 ° rather than the desired wings-level attitude.
The heading angle we have not totally defined vet. We are trying to get some
additional photographs to enable us to evaluate this.
Figures 13a, 13b, 13c, and 13d are a sequence of _hotographs that show the
airplane just prior to impact. They show the no. 1 engine impacting first and then
the fuselage. It is interesting to note that the engines on the left wing are really
distorted.
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• REPRESENTATIVE OF: A SURVIVABLE ACCIDENT
• CRASII: AIR-TO-SURFACE; FINAL APPROACH/LANDING, MISSED APPROACH,
AND/OR TAKEOFF ABORT
• AIRCRAFI" CONFIGURATION: LANING GEAR RETRACTED, FLAPS, SPOILERS
(AS REQUIRED), SYMMETRICAL/STABILIZED
+3
SINK RATE: 17 -2 FPS • IA3NGITUDINALVELOCITY'-- 150 +_' KNOTS_L_
m GLIDE PATH: 3.3°TO 4.0 ° • GROSS WEIGHT" 175-195,000 FOUNDS
FI_d'_GIBLE AMKOBSTRUCTIONS NOSEUP: +I ° + 1°
-_'_" lj'_i_ , /--_ i-'--II
IMPACT GOAl.S: AMK--W1NG TANK RUPTURN, 20-100 GALl,tONS PER SECOND
{SINGLE [_INT RUPTURE), 4-5 SECONDS EXPOSURE WITH POSITIVE
AMK IGNITION, SLIDE-OUT TO I00 KTS
CI_J_.SHWORTHINESS--SURVIVABLE IMPACT, MAINFrAIN FUSELAGE
INTEGRITY, VERICAL IMPACT PULSE (I SECOND), LONGITUDINAL
ACCELERATION DATA
Figure i. Planned CID impact scenario.
Figure 2. CID technical approach.
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Figure 3. CID airborne RPV control system.
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Figure 4. CID ground-based RPV control system.
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Figure 5. CID impact profile.
Figure 6. CID crash site.
22
Figure 7. CID wing opemers.
* 14 manned flights flown
- Total flight time 31.4 h
- Total RPV time was 52.2 percent of
total
- 9 RPV takeoffs and 13 RPV landings
- 69 CID approaches to altitudes be.
tween 150 and 200 ft
Figure 8. CID manned flight summary.
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1. BRAKE RELEASE 09:13:12
2. INITIAL ROLL 09:13:16.8
3. ROTATION 09:14:21.5
4. LIFT OFF 09:14:24.5
5. GEAR RETRACTED 09:14:48.5
6. PUSHOVER TO FINAL 09:19:46.5
7. ENGINE NO. 1 IMPACT 09:22:10.97
8. FUSELAGE IMPACT 09:22:10.99
9. PCM POWER FAIL 09:22:11.00
10. TOTAL DATA FAIL 09:22:12.8
Figure 9. CID mission timeline.
PRE ENGINE START GROSS WT 200,455 LBS
C.G. 22.6% MAC
FUEL USED FROM C.W. TANK 8,072 LBS
IMPACT GROSS WT 192,383
C.G. 24.2% MAC
76,058 LBS OF AMK WAS LOADED FOR THE CID MISSION
Figure i0. CID missionweight and balance.
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19. Engine Dueling 44. Heat Exchanger 19. EPR Transmitter 44. Generator 69. No. 4 Engine HPC-Turb
20. Engine Cowling 4_. Pylon Fairing 20. Oil Presser Switch 45. Oil Pump 70. CSD and Generelor
:1. Cowling 44. Right Wlnl Section 21. CSD Housing Segment 46. Generator 71. Fuel Pump
22. Cowling 47. Engine Inlet Cowl 22. EPB Transmitter 47. 7th Stage Dish Rim/Slides 72. CSD and Generate#
23. Pylon 48. Tire 23, Ignltar Unit 48. Generator Winding 73. 17 pisces Blades _ Vanes
24. Throttle Linkage 4g, Tire b Wheal 24. Igniter Unit 49. Compressor Blade Sag. 74. No. 3 Engine HPC/Turb
:r. Lower Fuselage Antenna Panel MISCELLANEOUS 25+ Engine Exhaust Section EO+ Generator Case _. Oil Pump Housing
_S. Oil Tank
1. Sttlker Polo
2. Light Pole
Figure ii. CID wreckage distribution.
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THE TARGET CONDITIONS IN TERMS OF DESIRED AND ACCEPTABLE RANGES,
TOGETHER WITH THE MEASURED VALUES, ARE AS FOLLOWS:
DESIRED ACCEPTABLE MEASURED
SINK RATE (FPS) 15-17 15-20 17.3
LONGIT. VEL. (KTS) 150-155 145-155 151.5
PITCH ATTITUDE (DEG) I 0-2 0
LONGIT. DEVIATION (FT) -75 TO +75 -125 TO +75 -128 NOTE I
OR
-410 NOTE 2
LATERAL DEVIATION (FT) -15 TO +15 -15 TO +15 +45 NOTE I
ROLL ATTITUDE (DEG) -I TO +I -I TO +1 -12 NOTE 2
HEADING ANGLE (DEG) -I TO +I -I TO +I NOTE 3
NOTE I. MEASURED AT A POINT WHERE FUSELAGE MADE INITIAL CONTACT.
NOTE 2. MEASURED AT POINT OF INITIAL GROUND CONTACT (WHERE
NUMBER I ENGINE IMPACTED THE GROUND).
NOTE 3. OVERHEAD PHOTOS ARE NEEDED TO DETERMINE VALUE.
PHOTOS NOT YET RELEASED TO NASA.
o ASSUMED AIRCRAFT WOULD BE STABILIZED AT IMPACT.
o AT 200 FT THE ClD PROFILE WAS NOMINAL LONGITUDINALLY,
OFF NOMINAL LATERALLY.
Figure 12. CID actual impact scenario.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 13. CID impact.
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(d)
Figure 13. Concluded.
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